ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
he concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has taken on increasing interest for both firms and their stakeholders. The latter continue to focus on the potential impact of company business in the economic, social, and environmental spheres, thereby pushing companies to redefine their responsibilities toward society, establish actions to protect the environment and combat exclusion, and/or participate in the local economy. Indeed, stakeholders are those with rights to the account and it is for them that the account is prepared (Gray et al., 1997) . From this perspective, CSR can be considered as a company's response to social and environmental issues through strategies and methods of control, monitoring, evaluation, and reporting that incorporate new approaches to performance (Capron & Quairel-Lanoizelée, 2007) .
With regard to family-owned businesses, several studies have examined the impact of family involvement on the development of CSR practices. These studies have found that the more the family is present in company management, the greater the effort to develop CSR (Aronoff & Ward, 1995; Chrisman et al., 2005 ; O'Boyle et al., 2010). However, no study to our knowledge has focused on the commitment of French family businesses to CSR according to governance mode. This paper provides an initial assessment of CSR practices in family-owned companies in the current economic crisis and with respect to the degree of family involvement in firm governance. We briefly review the concept of CSR and then analyze the impact of family involvement on CSR practices from a performance perspective. Our research hypotheses are presented in the second section. The methodology and the empirical results of our work are detailed in the third and fourth sections. We then finish our study with a discussion and a general conclusion. Maignan and Ralston (2002) . Our measurement scale consists of five groups of indicators: ethics and sustainability (group 1), environmental management (group 2), responsible products (group 3), social conduct (group 4), and governance (group 5). Our major assumption is that firms demonstrate their commitment to social responsibility by adopting codes and developing and publishing CSR reports. In addition, the interest that firms show for the natural environment can be determined from environmental policies and/or supply chain management. Transparency about environmental performance and the management of environmental risks allow us to identify how a firm manages its environmental "footprint." The company commitment to CSR is also reflected through the creation and development of responsible products. These products benefit from eco-design processes that reduce the weight and volume of packaging, make use of appropriate components and raw materials, and ensure production based on energy efficiency and minimal carbon dioxide emissions. Social conduct refers to the assessment of a firm's internal and external social commitment: internal through its relationship with employees and external through its community involvement, volunteering, sponsoring, etc. Last, governance allows us to assess how the firm operates in this respect to reach CSR goals. Here we assess, for example, leadership commitment to CSR and stakeholder involvement in corporate governance.
It should be noted that our use of binary encoding (0 or 1) for the CSR scores could be seen as a limitation of our study. Indeed, there is a potential argument for attaching weights to each CSR activity item because some items might be considered to be more important or have greater information value to the public than other items (see, e.g., Wallace, 1988) . However, counter-arguments have also been raised for not using weights. Thus, Lanis and Richardson (2012) state that: (1) attaching weights to each CSR activity item assumes that certain items are more important than others, which could be a subjective assessment and may not necessarily be the case; and (2) within a large sample of CSR activity items, the different weights for CSR activity items could average or even-out. Moreover, empirical evidence based on research by Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) and Arzeski (1996) , for example, indicates that there is little need to attach weights to CSR activity items. Therefore, we decided not to attach weights to any of the 25 individual CSR activity items in study.
Our main source of information is the documentation provided by the family firms, and we studied the CSR reports published from 2005 to 2011. When a firm did not provide a CSR report, we used the activity report and/or annual report to score CSR. These scores are derived by calculating the number of indicators forming each group. For example, if we have six indicators for "social conduct" and a company shows a positive score for three of them, the company is assigned a score of 50% for "social conduct." Appendix A summarizes the indictors used to identify the CSR practices of French family firms.
Independent Variable
Our independent variable is denoted by the dummy variable governance (GOV), which takes a value of 1 when the family firm is managed by a family member CEO and 0 otherwise.
Control Variables
We include several control variables from the CSR literature in our OLS regression model to control for other effects. They include corporation size, activity sector, and return on assets. Data for these control variables were collected from the DIANE financial database. For corporation size (SIZE), previous research (see, e.g., Stanwick & Stanwick, 1998; Johnson & Greening, 1999) shows that it is positively associated corporate social performance. Specifically, due to their higher visibility, larger corporations are likely to provide more extensive corporate social performance information in the annual report than smaller corporations (Cho et al., 2010) . We measure SIZE as the natural log of total assets.
We include activity sector (SECT) in our study as a control variable given that previous research (see, e.g., Stray & Ballantine, 2000; Cormier et al., 2004) shows that the activity sector makes a corporation much more visible to the public and to the community at large. Thus, firms belonging to sectors sensitive to the environment (energy, chemicals, mining, and construction) provide more corporate social performance information than others. We measure SECT as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the family firm's activity sector is sensitive to the environment and 0 otherwise.
Finally, for return on assets (ROA), recent literature reviews have found a rather positive relationship between social performance and financial performance. This is particularly the case of the work of Margolis and Walsh (2003) on 127 empirical studies for the period 1972-2002. Of the 127 studies, 109 analyzed the link between social performance and financial performance. According to this meta-analysis, 54 studies (50%) resulted in a positive link, 7 studies found a negative relationship, 28 studies reported a non-significant relationship, and 20 studies found a mixed relationship. These results are confirmed by the work of Orlitzky et al. (2003) with a metaanalysis of 52 empirical studies. We measure ROA as pre-tax income divided by total assets.
Regression Model
To test our hypotheses, we estimated the following OLS regression model: CSR = β 0 + β1 GOV + β 2 SIZE + β 3 SECT + β 4 ROA + ε where: CSR = the family firm's social performance estimated by the total score of the indicators listed in Appendix A; GOV = a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the family firm is managed by a family member CEO and 0 otherwise; SIZE = the firm size measured by the natural logarithm of total assets; SECT = a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the family firm's activity sector is sensitive to the environment (energy, chemicals, mining, and construction) and 0 otherwise; ROA = return on assets measured as pre-tax income divided by total assets; and ε: the error term.
RESULTS
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Appendix In 2011, all family firms had a certified environmental management system. All firms provided an explicit environmental policy, had a sustainable supply chain policy, provided quantitative measures of environmental performance, and had a policy for environmental risk management and an account for environmental risk. In contrast, in 2005, four companies in Category A and one company in Category B had no quantifiable objectives for environmental management. The firm in Category B also had no transparent environmental performance.
Concerning responsible products, all companies used eco-design processes and made efforts to improve customer awareness about "sustainable" approaches. In contrast, no company seemed interested in partnering with competing or complementary companies to create a CSR market. Furthermore, in 2005, only one company in Category B did not exclude toxic components, as opposed to four companies in Category A. In 2011, three of these firms still had no product component policy.
Concerning social conduct, all firms were active with respect to sponsoring local communities and NGOs and could be characterized by their community involvement. All firms offered training and education facilities and had diversity and equal opportunity policies for their employees. All had a code of ethical conduct and maintained dialogue with their employees in 2011, although one firm in Category A had no dialogue with its employees in 2005.
Concerning governance, the top managers of all firms expressed a commitment to CSR. All firms assessed their improvement in CSR actions, conducted internal evaluations of CSR policies, and involved stakeholders in their governance. In 2005, three companies in Category A had no external evaluation of their CSR policy, whereas all of them had these evaluations in 2011. Figures 1 and 2 indicate that family firms managed by a competent external manager had better social performance than those managed by a family member CEO, with a score of 92% for 2011 for all firms in Category B, while only three companies in Category A had a similar score. This finding is more significant for the 2005 CSR scores. The highest score in Category A was 84% and concerned a single company, while it was 88% for 50% of the companies in Category B. 
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of our variables are reported in Table 1 . The CSR levels of the corporations in our sample are relatively high with mean (median) of 86,176 (88). Variable definitions: CSR = social performance index between 0% and 100%; SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = pre-tax income divided by total assets; GOV = a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the family firm is managed by a family member CEO and 0 otherwise; SECT = a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the family firm's activity sector is sensitive to the environment (energy, chemicals, mining, and construction) and 0 otherwise. Table 1 also reports the descriptive statistics of the other continuous variables in our base regression model. SIZE has a mean (median) of 7,008 (7,045) and ROA has a mean (median) of 6,147 (3,890).
For the dummy variables, we report that for GOV, the slight majority of our sample (60%) comprises of corporations that are managed by a family member CEO. However, for SECT we find that a slight majority of the sample (61%) represents corporations belonging to activity sector non sensitive to the environment.
Overall, an acceptable range of variation is observed for all of the variables presented in Table 1 
Correlation Results
The Pearson pairwise correlation results are presented in Table 2 . The correlations show that CSR is significantly negatively associated with GOV (p < .001). These results indicate that the higher the corporation's level of family involvement, the lower is the level of corporate social performance, therefore providing some additional support for H 2 . We also find significant positive correlation between CSR and SIZE. As expected, larger corporations provide more corporate social smaller corporations. Variable definitions: CSR = social performance index between 0% and 100%; SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = pre-tax income divided by total assets; GOV = a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the family firm is managed by a family member CEO and 0 otherwise; SECT = a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the family firm's activity sector is sensitive to the environment (energy, chemicals, mining, and construction) and 0 otherwise. N = 68 for all variables. * Significance at the .10 level; ** Significance at the .05 level; *** Significance at the .01 level. Table 2 also reports the correlations between the explanatory variables. It shows that only moderate levels of collinearity exist between the explanatory variables used in our study. The highest correlation coefficient is between GOV and ROA of -0,256 (p < .005). Moreover, we also calculate variance inflation factors (VIFs) when estimating our base regression model to test for signs of multi-collinearity among the explanatory variables. Our results reported in Table 3 confirm that no VIFs exceed five for any of our explanatory variables, so multicollinearity is not problematic in our base regression model.
Regression Results
The OLS regression results used to test our hypotheses are reported in Table 3 . The regression coefficient for GOV is negative and significant (p < 0,01), which provides further support for H 2 and is consistent with selfinterest theory. Variable definitions: CSR = social performance index between 0% and 100%; SIZE = the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA = pre-tax income divided by total assets; GOV = a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the family firm is managed by a family member CEO and 0 otherwise; SECT = a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the family firm's activity sector is sensitive to the environment (energy, chemicals, mining, and construction) and 0 otherwise. N = 68 for all variables. * Significance at the .10 level; ** Significance at the .05 level; *** Significance at the .01 level. Table 3 also shows that some of the regression coefficients for the control variables are significant. Indeed, SIZE is positive and significant (p < 0,01) as expected. Due to their higher visibility, larger corporations provide more corporate social performance than smaller corporations. Finally, the regression coefficients for SECT and ROA are not significant.
Robustness Checks
We performed several robustness checks to evaluate the reliability of the OLS regression results presented in Table 3 . First, we entered the control variables consecutively into the regression model and obtained similar results for GOV. Second, we dropped the control variables from the regression model, and our results for GOV were unchanged. Third, we computed variance inflation factors (VIFs) when estimating our regression model to test for signs of multi-collinearity between the explanatory variables. As no VIF exceeded five, we concluded that multicollinearity was not a major concern in our study (Hair et al., 2006) . Overall, our OLS regression results are reliable.
DISCUSSION
Our findings show a negative and significant relationship between family involvement and corporate social performance. Thus, the higher the corporation's level of family involvement, the lower is the level of corporate social performance. CSR practices are then more developed in firms managed by a competent external CEO compared with those managed by a family member CEO. Our Hypothesis H 2 is thus corroborated while Hypothesis H 1 is rejected. We therefore confirm the conclusion of Morck and Yeung (2003) , who state that a very strong degree of family control leads to a lower level of social responsibility.
Our results also show that French family firms increased their social performance during the 2005-2011 period. Thus, French family firms show a strategic interest in CSR, which can be seen as a driver of overall performance, which requires long-term commitment, and as an opportunity to better respond to the demands of the current economic context. Our results support the conclusions of Peloza (2006) , who states that good social performance does not mean just benefits and profits, but can also be seen as a buffer to reduce the negative events that can result from downturns. Indeed, although the investment needed to establish and develop CSR practices is costly and generates expenses that will weigh on financial performance, French family firms are well aware that these expenses will be compensated by increased revenues through access to new markets sensitive to ethical considerations and strengthened employee productivity. 
